You also do not understand what “ad hominem” means.
I am describing your action (not understanding of a topic, yet trying to forcefully push it, destroying BCH), not your personal property (like “this guy is stupid”, “this guy is a pig”).
Maybe learn to actually use Wikipedia like you suggested, wikipedia/wiktionary actually properly describes what ad-hominem means.
Since you are so knowledgeable on the subject, you can maybe tell me if posting a quote is an ad hominem?
You are not “posting a quote”. You are directly suggesting that I am a stupid pig, because I disagree with you.
Do you see me comparing you to a pig, other animal or even a stupid person anywhere? No.
This is the difference between you and me. I can describe your actions without describing your person specifically.
You cannot.
Maybe go try to use LLM to help you discuss better, you certainly are not good at it.
So to sum up our options (I sorted them in my preferred order):
Pick your poison…
These 2 can’t be true at the same time. If BCH grows to having $1B locked up in some DeFi, then price will be up and it would cost maybe $80k/hour, maybe more, to attack.
Just nuking a chain of TXs grabs 0 value. How would a miner profit off that when he can’t replay an alternative chain?
Yes. The first one will never happen since no one will use such an insecure system. So the network effect will go in reverse when people see it’s not secure. PoW is not very secure in the short term, but it’s good at accumulating security. Unfortunately we need more security in the short term.
Are you talking about co-signing schemes?
I’m talking about when you make at trade you sign your part of the trade, right now our DEXs work like this: maker creates an anyone-can-spend UTXO that requires some amount of BCH to release some tokens. Taker provides the BCH and claims the tokens. But taker signs the UTXO funding the TX with BCH. It can not be replayed with some other AMM UTXOs or a different state of AMM UTXOs, because taker TX targets a particular UTXO.
It is possible for taker to create an anyone-can-spend “buy order” - he funds an AMM UTXO of his own, and then anyone can pit the UTXO against some other AMM UTXO in order to fill the order. And there, miners could try extract something from the spread (if any) by rearranging stuff, but so what? Both users who made their respective buy and sell orders will get exactly what they ordered in any case.
When market moves you will build transaction chains from each AMM UTXO. So if market moves 10% in two hours and you still have no block, it’s very cheap for a miner to orphan those transactions and replace the first one with their own. This way you are basically trading while knowing 100% where the market is going.
Sure, so you have USDC and want buy BCH at $300, but then BCH moves on some other market and external price is now $330, yeah?
Ok, miner nukes you chain. Then what? He has to use his own USDC to buy the BCH at $300, and then have it locked up in AMM to offer it at $330 to you (or anyone else, who may want to take it). But he can’t automatically make you take that order - you need to sign for the new UTXO.
Or, if you had a “buy order” AMM UTXO set at $300, it won’t fill if the “sell order” UTXO is now at $330, so no trade happens, and miner has his USDC locked up.
How does he make money here?
If he’s a taker he can just move the BCH directly to SideShift. If he’s a maker he unlocks before moving it to SideShift.
It’s just arbitrage, and it requires capital and has its own risks. Nobody will even try for peanuts, and if it’s not peanuts then cost of reorg will be way higher.
I get it, you just want to shill Avalanche, a solution looking for a problem, and you think this MEV can be inflated into a big enough problem to sell us the “solution”.
It’s not arbitrage. With arbitrage you move funds from one market to another to pocket the difference. Here you know future prices due to your power to reorg and erase other peoples trades.
Avalanche will sell itself when the attacks start. It also solves other issues.
It also unsolves some issues that PoW solves.
Mainly just bandwidth overhead.
Complete, utter nonsense.
Some issues you say 
With Compact Blocks you don’t have to miss that many transaction before it’s more efficient to just request the whole block instead of individual transactions.
What if same pools are participating in both relay networks? Looks like the market is choosing an alternative relay network over Core’s.
The point is that the MEV transactions in one block is only known by the pool producing it. This is due to for example a Moria liquidating transaction propagating on the network, but every pool working to include their own to collect the 1.2x. At around 10% unknown transactions it will be more efficient to download the whole block than requesting individual transactions. This is how Compact Blocks work.
Compact Blocks is the Core version of Xthin that was pioneered by BCH:
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/buip014-testing-a-bu-x-relay-network-for-miners-in-china.929/
