To some degree it seems very sensible, but it would also mean losing a significant advantage that the p2sh version has - hiding the script from prying eyes before it is being spent from.
It might not seem that important at first glance, but it actually provides both security and privacy for the users, as the time window in which a potential attacker have understand, find an exploit, and abuse a UTXO locked behind a hash is limited to after the spending transaction is known, which also puts them in a race condition.
Further, from a privacy perpsective, the hash allows the participants to keep information about what they are doing hidden until the point of spending.
Contracts with multiple possible spending mechanics could be made where you have the actual mechanic (say, illegal betting) under one condition, and then use an all-parties-agree-to-whatever condition that doesnāt reveal the full script and therefor doesnāt reveal the actual activity taking place, as long as the participants choose to agree with the outcome voluntarily. (this might need some more work to be made practical)
Iām not dead set in either way, so Iāll just see where the discussion goes for now.
BU has done some work on that front, it seems well designed although a CHIP would need to elaborate more on design decisions: OP_EXEC
In short: the code modules being loaded count towards all limits of the āmainā program, recursion depth and number of injections have sane limits, and the opcode user specifies how far into the stack the module will have access to and how many new items it may add. We have enough on our plate already, this is just to make note so itās not forgotten when time comes to discuss this.
The privacy by hashing issue is an interesting tool in the bag of privacy options. Other options of bip69, cashfusion and using a new address every use probably are, if not equally as powerful, probably even more powerful. Afterall, the aim here is to make millions of people use these script-types. With well written wallets we can all but remove the āsemiā in Satoshiās āSemi-anonymousā.
But, yeah, I understand the urge of using all tools available at this time.
I like your thinking when it comes to āillegal bettingā, great example. Lets hope that Crypto as a whole is not made illegal any time soon for any of you guys. Notice, btw, that in almost all countries betting in general is illegal, unless the local goverment can tax it. Ehm, I mean, licence it. Betting online
happens anyway, will always happen anyway.
So, there are better ways to do that, but indeed some may want to use all tools available. Question is if that is a reason to make BCH harder to maintain.
Iāll just say that we techies tend to severely over-estimate the privacy perspective and needs. No websites listing all BIP69 compliant wallets has popped up yet
Thanks for the writeup! Agreed that it would be a valuable for improving the overall security of the ecosystem so thereās no need for contract developers to learn or worry about this hash collision risk. I think itās a great idea to eliminate boolean malleability simultaneously, because this is another one of these quirks that is easily overlooked! I also like the idea of P2SH contracts using the same limit as the rest of the scriptSig and not being counted as one item being pushed to the stack.
Very glad to hear this!
Another major reason to keep complex scripts in the input besides privacy & security is who has to pay for the transaction fee. It does not make sense for the sender to have to pay for the receivers complicated contract.
This. Iām all for this too, and itās awesome that we can get more bang for the buck than just fixing a security hole in the P2SH feature.
The security argument is pretty much the same as it is for CashTokens/Group: we need 32 bytes because an attacker could create a collision and keep the more free contract to himself, secret for later use. Have everyone pay into the covenant, and when it grows big enough - steal everything.
It is also relevant to know that most of the usecases of smart contracts, especially with multiple people, the transaction that locks up the funds is made by those same people and as such its fine that they pay for any fees.
Iād love to get to a place where outputs can have non-standard contracts!
That would be particularly useful for covenant applications ā right now covenants have to waste 20 bytes (or for P2SH32, 32 bytes) and some contract bytes to place their next iteration in a P2SH output. And from the chainās perspective, this sometimes wastes an extra copy of each covenant contract (the P2SH hash preimage has to be constructed in the first transaction for validation and also pushed again in the second transaction ā though OP_ACTIVEBYTECODE usually eliminates this waste). It would be more efficient if covenants could simply validate the next output itself rather than doing the P2SH dance.
In practice though, there are some issues we need to solve first:
P2SH is currently protective in that it limits abuse of the contract system: with P2SH, transactions that are expensive to validate must include their own contract code within the spending transaction, so the expensive-to-validate transaction is much larger than it would be if that contract code was already present in the UTXO set.
This behavior is currently protecting miners from unwittingly creating expensive-to-validate blocks that include some malicious (non-standard) transactions and thus risking their blocks becoming stale during propagation (and/or set of miners possibly diverging due to such blocks). E.g. this worst-case contract could be stuffed into non-P2SH transactions with far fewer bytes per input. (Of course, part of this protection is that miners validate transactions themselves first before mining them, so honest miners are still reasonably protected if they only include transactions that have been broadcasted over the public network.)
Both of those issues are handled for P2SH contracts by a hashing limit as proposed above (a simplification of the VM Limits CHIP), but to get rid of isStandard, do we need to instead define a limit in relation to spending transaction size (i.e. a per-byte hashing budget)? I think that requires some review.
Beyond those validation cost questions, thereās also the question of data storage ā right now OP_RETURN outputs are generally limited to storing ~220 bytes of arbitrary data, but that limit is only meaningfully enforced by the concept of standardness. If output standardness is relaxed to allow custom contracts, thereās no reasonable way to prevent arbitrary data up to the same length as such contracts. So if, e.g., standardness was relaxed to allow output contracts up to 1650 bytes, OP_RETURN outputs of at least this size should also be allowed (and probably larger, since its in the networkās interest for data-carrier users to commit data in provably unspendable outputs, allowing us to prune that output from the UTXO set). Iāve written about how I think the current OP_RETURN limit is basically theater; I think in the long term weāll probably want to simplify standardness to treat output OP_RETURN data and contracts similarly (e.g. the same per-output byte limit), but we probably need a really rigorous review of the topic to get widespread consensus.
One final development direction this brings up: increased occurrences of larger outputs (containing, e.g. 1650 byte contracts) would mean that many node implementations may want to revisit how they represent the UTXO set. Right now most implementations keep the full contents of each UTXO accessible to fast lookups, but it would be possible to instead only keep the hash of UTXOs ā a UTXO Hash Set (UHS). This is part of the architecture explored by OpenCBDC. If a significant number of outputs are eventually larger than 32 bytes ā for raw output covenants and/or something like CashTokens ā some P2P protocol extension to enable pruned node implementations to use a UHS could be valuable.
So: I think relaxing standardness is a promising development direction. Thereās a lot of work to be done; Iām not sure we can get all the way there before upgrade 2023, but I support the effort!
If we relax output standardness, do we still need P2SH32?
Even if we were able relax output standardness by 2023, I still think it would be important to deploy some sort of P2SH32. Relaxing standardness would solve this 80-bit collision issue for āpublicā types of contracts (e.g. covenants), but itās not a complete alternative to P2SH32; without P2SH32, other use cases would be forced to accept reduced privacy/security (as others have mentioned).
On privacy/security, Iād just add that in my view, a critical security feature of P2SH wallets is that unspent funds are hard for an attacker to analyze. This contributes little to long-term privacy (when theyāre spent, they can be analyzed ā you still want to use CashFusion regularly), but in practice, I think it offers meaningful operational privacy and therefore security (from meatspace attackers). An organization having funds in a set of P2SH-based multisig wallets (held by different operational teams) has quite a different privacy/security posture than the same set of wallets using raw outputs. UTXOs of well-designed P2SH wallets are not trivial to cluster, but for the same raw-outputs wallet, an attacker could determine with greater certainty how much is currently available to steal and which teams they need to kidnap/blackmail.
From a high level, a rough mapping of use cases for which I think each option is superior:
P2SH20 ā Non-public, multi-party contracts with sufficiently interactive setups (can implement a pre-commitment scheme + HD derivation), saves 12 bytes vs. P2SH32, offers better privacy/security than raw outputs, and practically equivalent to Taproot for contracts with one/few spending paths. (Exception: highly-interactive use cases save even more with Taproot by looking like a single-signature spend.)
P2SH32 ā Same as P2SH20, but better for use cases where interactive setup is more costly (maybe for some particular use case, 12 bytes per output is a reasonable price for avoiding pre-commitment schemes), or the wallet adds new addresses over time (not a covenant, but participants create new addresses via some highly-asynchronous coordination method).
Raw outputs ā superior for covenants ā the contract validates the spending transaction (publicly, on-chain), so the most efficient place to do this is raw outputs. (Hypothetically, partially-public covenants could be designed for Taproot-like outputs so that only one covenant path is revealed during spend ā requires both Taproot and new opcodes though.)
Taproot (see @markblundebergās BCH Taproot discussion) ā most designs could be superior to P2SH20/32 for many use cases (especially with sufficiently-interactive parties) by saving at least the cost of the hash in collaborative spends (that look like single-signature spends).
Aside: Taproot
I think some Taproot-like construction would be a viable alternative to P2SH32 for many use cases (in the same way it would be a superior alternative to the existing P2SH20), but given that the network already supports P2SH20 ā and we arenāt going to ādeprecateā P2SH20 ā itās reasonable that the network should support a āhardenedā version of the P2SH primitive, too. The cost of adding a 32-byte variant in terms of protocol complexity/technical debt is trivial (P2SH20 already exists), but 1) the existence of a hardened P2SH32 option offers a much simpler upgrade path for vulnerable use cases, and 2) the hardened P2SH32 option offers some user-actionable resilience if a particular use case is discovered to be vulnerable to a new attack (when using the Taproot-like alternative).
And of course, as with OP_EVAL-like alternatives, I donāt expect weāll have sufficient information to settle on a specific Taproot design before 2023. BTC has already deployed multiple versions of its virtual machine, so the relative increase in protocol complexity from its recent Taproot deployment is not as significant as it would be on BCH (considering BTCās support for e.g. SegWit, the legacy sighash algorithm, etc.). BCHās existing features and ecosystem also make deploying Taproot less valuable (BCH has more advanced contracts, covenants, and low fees + CashFusion), so we should take our time selecting a particular Taproot design, if any.
TL;DR
I think we should work on both: relaxing standardness would be great for covenants, and P2SH32 is important for privacy/security of non-covenant use cases.
Some future Taproot design could also replace P2SH (and P2PKH) for most use cases, but that doesnāt mean we should leave P2SH āpartially brokenā ā weāre not going to deprecate P2SH20, so we should also support P2SH32 for completeness/out of an abundance of caution.
A threshold signature scheme (TSS) enables a group of parties to collectively compute a signature without learning information about the private key. In a (t, n)-threshold signature scheme, n parties hold distinct key shares and any subset of t + 1 ā¤ n distinct parties can issue a valid signature, whereas any subset of t or fewer parties canāt. TSSā setup phase relies on distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, whereby the parties generate shares without exposing the key. In practice, TSS is often augmented with a reshare protocol (a.k.a. share rotation), to periodically update the shares without changing the corresponding key.
Some quick responses. As usual, bitjsons posts are long and loaded with gems, so Iāll try to come back for other points that need more thinking.
This kind of issue has been the main reason for the sun-setting of sigops. We now use SigCheck which I think catches the issue you are talking about. It runs at validation time and thus it becomes agnostic to where the complexity comes from. It will catch it regardless of being part of an input or an output.
This then protects the network from blocks and/or transactions that are overly heavy on the validation phase.
I agree. From my point of view this is a economic matter that devs should not be in charge of. I donāt think it makes sense to define limits at any standardness or even consensus level to govern which data should be allowed to be mined. There are strong economic incentives available, I feel that the best way to solve this allocation of production-space is by allowing miners to set fees and priorities on them.
This is a discussion topic that indeed would be good to have, my current feeling is that we can redefine transaction-priority (which transactions combine into what size block) and move from our solution today where it is just about fees but create a score based on transaction-local properties like it spending more utxos than it creates. And, in the context of this point, the amount of block-space it uses which are not for economic activity.
Most of this is still quite irrelevant with current blocksizes, which is likely why its not been discussed much
This is a very good point. The original UTXO did not actually copy the output script into the UTXO, that was added by Core much later. Anyone good at databases would loathe to see people dumping bytearrays in the same row as your primary-key.
What happened is that in order to make pruning work the output scripts had to go somewhere, since the original data would be deleted. Someone figured that the UTXO was to be that place.
I would expect an effort for the reference client that moves the output scripts out of the UTXO to not be a huge amount of work. Not simple, but not overly complex either. The goal is simply copying the output scripts somewhere safe and occasionally pruning those separately, so they donāt have any negative impact on the UTXO database.
Actually, each full node has a very different way of doing this today. Flowee the Hub has its own UTXO database (a raw C++ codebase), Bitcoin Verde uses a SQL one. BCHD is something different again (I donāt know really). BCHN still uses the way you are talking about.
But it should be pointed out that while this is more relevant the longer the data stored in there becomes, the tests on huge blocks shows that this is not a bottleneck any time soon. So those improvements are rather academic in nature.
P2SH is something enforced by the Script VMās hypervisor that is the native consensus code, it āhacksā the Script VM state from outside the sandbox.
The paradigm (send to address, spender reveals the contract later) has stood the test of time well, but in hind-sight it is obvious that the implementation could have been better.
It is what it is for historical reasons which deployed upgrades as soft-forks, and, as you clearly demonstrated, thereās still baggage of those upgrades to sort out.
We can stop pretending it belongs inside script - at all, and extract the contract hash and hashed contract code into their own respective transaction fields using the non-breaking PreFiX method.
Something like the belowā¦
real unlocking script, variable number of raw bytes
sequence number, 4-byte uint
ā¦
input N
Introspection
New one, OP_OUTPUTLOCKHASH = 0xED - pops an index, returns the hash or empty stack item if feature is not used on the output. This completes definition of 0xED across all 3 contexts (input, VM, output).
OP_UTXOBYTECODE would return an empty stack item.
OP_ACTIVEBYTECODE would work the same.
OP_INPUTBYTECODE would work the same from Script VM PoV, it would return the whole thing i.e. concatenation of real unlocking script and redeem script
When broadcasted, transactions could even omit the actual redeem script from the input if it matches one seen before, because nodes will already have it and could retrieve them unless pruned.
Fundamentally it doesnāt even matter how nodes learn of some script, whether itās been broadcasted as locking script (relaxed standardness), or as redeem script (P2SH unlocking script), nodes will only need it at time of execution - when unlocking the input and updating the UTXO state. ābareā output gives it before it will be needed, and P2SH gives it the scriptās primary key first, and data will come later.
I think we need to recognize that P2SH and OP_EVAL are fundamentally different even if theyād seemingly do the same thing, because theyāre in different execution context. P2SH context is the hypervisor (consensus) layer while OP_EVAL is called within a particular VM, where the VM gets to control its execution state - it knows that itās about to run some module of its own code authenticated with the OP_EVAL hash, and so the module must be a valid bytecode for that VM, and if unknown hashes were let in, then the contract could even pre-authenticate some known template at runtime, letting potential spenders keep their variable data private if the execution path will not be used.
My point is - itās not one or the other - weād want both P2SH32 (hopefully 2023) and OP_EVAL (later)
Some more theoretical ramblingsā¦
P2SH is fundamentally VM agnostic but its true nature may not be obvious because itās been rolled out as if part of a VM. In theory it could support multiple VMs and languages while also hiding which VM itāll use until time of execution comes, hiding everything about how some UTXO can be spent. @tom 's points about database structure made me realize that. Every UTXO is associated with some spending constraint. Itās a relationship (UTXOs) M ā 1 (Constraints). If we use constraint hash as Constraints primary key it makes it easier to reason about - you just need to ignore those few bytes of P2SH wrapping that make it look like a Script when itās really not.
Then, thinking in blockckain-as-database mental model we can better observe the difference between ābareā and P2SH, and how it relates to database operations:
ābareā executes 2 inserts: one in Constraints table (hash as key, code as value), other in UTXO table (outpoint ref. as key, hash as foreign key, sat amount as data that is related 1-to-1)
p2sh seemingly does the same where the Constraints table would have a null in place of Script (hash as key, NULL as value) but it does not ACTUALLY do this because the hash is available in the UTXO map so we save an insert into Constraints operation here
when execution time comes, what happens:
ābareā 1 delete from UTXO, (optional delete from Coinstraints)
p2sh: 1 insert into Constraints, 1 delete from UTXO, (optional delete from Coinstraints)
Deletes are authenticated by the spender, who provides the data for the Constraint to unlock, and in order to be able to provide data he ought to be aware of the Constraint before sending the TX, and so we relieve nodes of keeping that stuff in the blockchain state because they donāt need it until they get the unlocking values from the spender, and because Constraints always had some unique data then we didnāt bother keeping them around so we skipped managing the Constraints table entirely and saved an insert and later housekeeping deletes.
That held well till we got Introspection. It changes the game, because it makes possible to code contract where data is detached in another output, so we can have contract templates with a fixed hash, and if some contract template is often used then it would make sense to cache its code by nodes. Even so, relaxing the networking standarness rules would matter only for the first reveal of the contract (and saving some input bytes when forward-validating the next contract step). Alternative would be for contract authors to just do a single spend and reveal the contract to everyone and nodes could update the Contracts table just the same.
Next spend would only require the Contract key (hash) to be broadcasted and network messages could be optimized for this, so transactions could omit the Script code entirely if it matches a previously seen one.
Anyway, lots of interesting stuff for research, itād be easy to get lost in it However, clock is ticking, if we want P2SH32 then letās go for the least-friction upgrade for 2023: just extend the legacy wrapper format
0xA914111122223333444455556666777788889999000087 with 0xA820111122223333444455556666777788889999000011112222333344445555666687.
It would be real nice to snip off the 87, and also save a byte or two on the inputās push opcode with scripts longer than 75b.
Yup, we can leave this debt repayment to some future transaction format upgrade, which P2SH32 using the familiar template will not preclude.
Other than cryptographic security hardening (20 to 32, bringing all our cryptographic primitives to the same level of security), we have here identified 3 buckets of technical debt that we have a chance of repaying:
Unnecessary overheads in P2SH transaction encoding;
Tangling a āhypervisorā (consensus) instruction with Script VM bytecode. (stack item size limit)
We can easily repay 2. and partially 3., and note that we can repay 3. as a side-effect of the hard-forking P2SH32 upgrade because it will be a pattern distinct from the legacy 20-byte one so we can use it to modulate opcode behavior for the upgraded feature without breaking the old feature. Kind of similar to how we can modulate how locktime is interpreted (BIP-0068).
The CHIP should also be informative, in hope that non-node software developers will learn of possibility of upgrading the format later, and not assume a particular wrapping of the constraint hash.
Prompted by this discussion, I have started writing an āeverything P2SHā document, rather broad in scope. Itās still a WIP and Draft can be found here, open to feedback.
Having jumped into hash functions rabbit hole, there will be a part on future quantum resistance (just realized, I think I made a wrongful claim about H160 quantum security, will fix soon), and on the SHA-256 vs HASH-256 question. (edit: done).
Then, there should be a small CHIP which proposes only the āhardenedā P2SH pattern upgrade, without the extras:
At first I was convinced by the argument for OP_SHA256, but having done some research, the possibility of length-extension still spooks me.
This is true for addresses which have already revealed their contract, but it still applies to confidential contracts that could be updating themselves with a new secret on each spend. Length extension attack allows someone to copy (NOT change the extisting utxo) any contract and append arbitrary data to the end of it. I donāt know of a way to exploit this, if there even exists a way. The vulnerability is NOT currently present in P2SH-20, so why should we break whatās not already broken, even if we think itās not exploitable.
The SHA-256 function is completely broken to length-extension because the final hash is the functionās complete internal state after processing the message, so anyone can just pretend thereās more of the message to hash and continue hashing to generate the hash of a longer message.
The composite we use for P2PKH and P2SH is NOT, because while both RIPEMD-160 and SHA-256 are broken there, the composite hides the internal state of the inner SHA-256 so the message canāt be extended. Same works for double SHA-256.
Core went with SHA256 for their P2WSH. However, their contract language and possible structures will never be as versatile as ours. Using the double makes the hash function close to a ārandom oracleā, and some future cryptographic proofs may have to rely on it being one.
The P2SH32 will be the foundation of all the cool future stuff, and we use double SHA-256 everywhere, so letās not accidentally introduce a weakest link again when the whole point of the upgrade is to strengthen the weakest link.
Note: The 1 BCH (and 1 BTC) output is unspendable because the hash is that of the genesis block, but in wrong byte order.
An output with the correct byte order was created and spent using the genesis block header as signature, shortly after creation of the unspendable one.
OP_HASH160
Also, there are some pre-BIP16 UTXOs that have likely become unspendable due to BIP16
Iām done reviewing that one, and would just like to carry one aspect of my review to this thread here.
Concerning the discussion of hash functions, the current proposal limits itself to single/double SHA256.
BLAKE2s would be one a candidate that offers protection against length extension attacks while giving the same bitwise security as e.g. HASH256.
I think it just deserves a mention in passing that in theory, there are additional hash functions like that one which could meet our needs. In practice, I think the costs outweigh and Iām also not inclined to believe weād be going wrong with HASH256 for our 32-byte hash.
Please donāt use pure HASH256. Currently, I can see three cases, where this is used, and if we add that to P2SH, then it will be the fourth case, and could be easily mistaken with other cases. If we have a script:
āOP_HASH256 someHash OP_EQUALā, then we could pass here:
some 64-byte merkle branch
some 80-byte block header
some N-byte transaction
you propose to add P2SH to this list
If we want to use SHA-256, then fine, letās use that. But please at least add some 512-bit prefix to change IV, to avoid hashing the same data in a completely different context. In general, messing up the context with double SHA-256 is unlikely to be exploited, because it requires mining a lot of hardcoded bits, but technically it could be possible in the future, so thatās why I think pure SHA-256 with the same initialization vector is a bad idea.
Weāre faced with a choice between SHA-256 and HASH-256, other functions or same functions with different IVs would have a big cost in updating all other software that has to parse addresses and pay into outputs. If we were prepared to pay that cost then might as well upgrade to a new function.
You canāt just pass anything as redeem script it MUST be a valid Script VM bytecode to unlock. The hashlock output pattern allows any preimage though, and you can pass a raw block into a hashlock contract even now, whatās the problem with that? See this transaction posting the genesis block header as input unlocking script: Transaction 09f691b2263260e71f363d1db51ff3100d285956a40cc0e4f8c8c2c4a80559b1
Security of P2SH relies on collision resistance, not on it being a random oracle (where real functions become less so with each public query). What good is a database of known preimages when they arenāt valid redeem scripts?
same functions with different IVs would have a big cost in updating all other software that has to parse addresses and pay into outputs
Everything will be new, so it is possible to not change the format of the previous three cases, but choose the format of the new address to not interfere with other things. So, instead of doing SHA-256(redeemScript), it is just a matter of doing SHA-256(redeemPrefix||redeemScript). And the size of that redeemPrefix should be 512 bits, in this way it can be easily implemented as a SHA-256, executed with some prefixed data.
You canāt just pass anything as redeem script it MUST be a valid Script VM bytecode to unlock.
I can imagine a valid redeem script, that would be also a valid transaction at the same time. Just one big PUSH, then some output script, then some OP_PUSH and OP_DROP in the timelock.
The hashlock output pattern allows any preimage though, and you can pass a raw block into a hashlock contract even now, whatās the problem with that?
Well, I used this hashlock script just as an example. But even in the context of this hashlock: it would be useful to require some specific type of hashed data. For now, checking it by OP_SIZE is the only option. Maybe some OP_CAT or OP_SPLIT could also do the trick, but it makes the whole script longer (so also more expensive).
Iām all for this too, and itās awesome that we can get more bang for the buck than just fixing a security hole in the P2SH feature.
However, clock is ticking, if we want P2SH32 then letās go for the least-friction upgrade for 2023: just extend the legacy wrapper format