Just feel the need to point out that the blocksize of sha256 is 64 bytes, not 32.
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Oh yeah good point so if one were to round-up the cost def. should be multiples of the block size 64 bytesā¦ sorry about that; thanks for pointing that outā¦
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From an architectural point of view, I would advice to think about this in the vain of there being two mempools.
First the one you know, inside of the full node. Its task is to make the network function (detect double spends etc) and for normies as well as miners this mempool is important to make sure that block transfer is cheap. Which means, it should have all the transactions that might be in the next block so we can avoid fetching them afterwards.
The second mempool would be one explicitly for mining software.
Ideally it can be connected to a full node and slave to is so it is simply a subset from the full nodeās mempool in order to avoid any and all validation. Keep it simple, and all that.
But adding new transactions to this mempool can be done much more leniently and take more CPU time (probably multi-threaded) in order to give weights and scores to transactions. Include the highest scoring ones and bumb less happy ones.
So, I imagine this second mempool to be snapshotted for a block template regularly and various algorithms can be used to make the most profitable block within the parameters given. Because weāll inevitably end up with more transactions than will fit in blocks and selection then should be done smarter than just on fees.
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Thank you all for digging into this! Iām mostly AFK until December, so Iām sorry Iāll have to come back to thread later. Just wanted to link to recent related discussion on limiting memory usage:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-October/022082.html
The patch bundles the limiting of total stack item memory usage into the stack depth limit.
Not sure if that ends up being simpler in most implementations than this CHIPās current approach, but I wonder if that strategy opens up more opportunities for skipping the validation in common cases (so implementations can check memory usage less often).
Anyways, this question is still the main item that I personally think needs more research for this CHIP to be ready:
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Flowee the Hub is probably the only one that has a validator which is compltely multi-threading. My thinking there has always been that we simply allocate the number of threads that the hardware supports (including hyperthreading) and queue jobs for the first thread to take.
As a result there will be at most N virtual machines (stack etc) in memory. Where N equals the number of virtual cores. Typically less as those VMs are cheap to start (though that may be an optimization in future).
My thumb-in-air feeling is that if we use 1MB per VM for things like stack, that is not even going to register. Iād be OK with 10MB, to stretching that to 25MB per VM.
Because in my 64cores machine, which can validate 64 transactions at a time, that would mean we allocate 1.6GB of memory max for the validation part. Which in 2024 is perfectly acceptable IMO.
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@cculianu has gotten acceptance from the other BCHN members to start work on implementing the āTargeted VM Limitsā CHIP in a branch of BCHN and do testing of those limits. 
This seems a great way to move the proposal forward, as a way to investigate and resolve the open questions about the stack memory usage limit - how expensive it is to measure and enforce compared to alternative solutions - and questions around the need for a limit stack depth.
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Copy pasting my own message from telegram, seems relevant:
Re: āDoes this make inscriptions (data storage) easier, that sounds badā:
The data storage question is pretty vague on BCH since putting things on the chain is quite cheap already regardless of method. imho we mainly have to address three things:
- Jpegs are not somehow made cheaper than other things (see also btc)
- Jpegs donāt somehow gain easy entrance into the UTXO
- Jpegs donāt somehow gain an excessively easy route, like a limitless opreturn. This is particularly very ill defined and open to debate.
Otherwise thereās nothing preventing people from just dumping a bunch of 200 byte opreturns on the chain today and assemble them into a jpeg offchain. ^ just to demonstrate that any such proposal doesnāt make it worse than status quo.
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Smart contract developers run into the opcode limit every so often. For example @dagurval ran into the limit implementing his āStable asset token - incentivized floating pegā contract, then optimized it, then later ran into the limit again and tweeted āThe BCH opcode limit is too damn low!ā
I also ran into the opcode limit when designing the improved sha-gate contract.
Sometimes it is possible to split the contract into 2 with relatively low overhead, other times like when trying to emulate math, the added complexity simply becomes practically prohibitive to use.
Agreed! After spending time thinking through āComposite Arithmetic Opcodesā and āThe need for additional Math opcodesā it became clear that best to allow this functionality to be emulated first, before it is added natively.
Cashscript library functionality, similar to that of Solidity, is not very useful currently because of the 201 opcode count limit. With the newly proposed limit of 10,000 bytes it would allow contract authors to emulate math/opcode functionality and easily abstract this into separate libraries.
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I see one major problem here: How do we name the new upgrade? 
Targeted Virtual Machine Limits makes āTVMLā. Hm, no good, need to work on this.
TaVLiMa
MiLViTa
How about ViLMa T.? As in Vilma Tlinstone?
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Fantastic! I started cleaning up the CHIP a bit in this PR: Propose for 2025 upgrade by bitjson Ā· Pull Request #6 Ā· bitjson/bch-vm-limits Ā· GitHub
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Just an update here: I plan to push this proposal for November 2024 lock in, May 2025 deployment. The latest revision is available at the repo:
Iāll continue my research on the open issues:
- Density-based hash digest iteration and signature verification limits
#8 - Replace
SigCheckswith a limitation onOP_CODESEPARATOR?#9 - Can the stack memory usage limit be improved?
#10
Iād appreciate any feedback here on those issues and on the latest draft proposal. You can also open new issues directly at the repo.
I plan to finalize those items and produce a complete set of VMB test vectors prior to the May 2024 upgrade so that node/VM implementation developers will have plenty of time to review before November.
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This is definitely needed, indeed.
Iāve been blunt with Jason in the last days, will do so again. Hope he will understand.
The bottom line with limits for the VM is that they are in practice limits for the C++ implementation as that is the only place where this is an actual realistic place weāll run those validations with massive throughput expectations.
For stack-limits, for instance, the current design uses a vector of byte-arrays. Two actually, since we have an alt-stack too. By far the most risky part of massive usage of the stack will then be the calls to malloc (which std::vector does internally). Especially if there is an expectation of doing tens of thousands of script validations every second, malloc is a bad choice and unstable.
To gather good stack-limits, then, is to start a small project (would likely be less than a man-month of work) which is a single class that does a single mem-allocation at full-node startup which represents the stack for this single specific script invocation. @cculianu will likely understand the idea without much explanation.
If that approach is taken, I expect that the script limits for stack can trivially go up to some 25MB without any issues to the full node. Even running 100 threads in parallel means only 5GB static allocation for this.
So, to repeat, the bottom line is that we need an actual implementation where full, parallel validation of scripts is possible in order to find the limits that are possible today and indeed for a long time in the future (decades).
Nobody doubts that the current limits should be raised, but my vote for what the new limits should be goes to a technical analysis based on actual written code.
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āTargetedā, not increased VM limits
I want to note again that this CHIP does not increase the primary VM limits:
- The effective processing limit before/after this CHIP is
1000 hash digest iterations. - The effective memory usage limit before/after this CHIP is approximately
130KB.
These existing limits are already well in excess of what we need today, and they may be sufficient for decades to come.
I recommend against any increase in these limits for 2025. If developers have use cases for higher limits, those can serve as motivation for future CHIPs.
What does āTargetedā mean?
The existing VM is very naive about limits: attackers can easily abuse the current limits, but honest users are stifled by them. This CHIP remedies the imbalance between attackers and honest users by counting VM processing and memory usage in a harder-to-abuse way.
Thereās much more detail in the Summary and Motivation sections. You can also see exactly how we calculate the existing limits in the Technical Specification.
Because this CHIP would change how those primary limits are enforced, all implementations would need to review their performance on the Benchmarks, especially those for OP_IF and OP_ROLL, and if necessary, implement O(1) algorithms where relevant, e.g. the O(1) Execution Stack mentioned in the CHIP. While these should generally be orders of magnitude less computationally expensive than the hashing limit, they may be bottlenecks (and thus DOS vectors) if naively implemented.
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This got a little complicated now.
For increased clarity, if I understand this right, there are 3 main limits in the script VM:
- 1: Processing limit: 1000 hash digest iterations
- 2: Memory usage limit: 130KB
- 3: Total Opcode script length limit: TOO DAMN LOW!
So we will be only increasing the 3rd limit. Please correct me if wrong.
A CHIP like this has two sides. You (and definitely various others in this space!), have a good grasp on the one side. The limits that get in your way. You identified some in your CHIP.
The second part here is the limits that make sense for a high-velocity implementation.
As I wrote above, the 130KB limit on script execution is pathetically low. In practice that can be massively increased.
What also is a bit weird in your CHIP is the counting of a select few opcodes. And having them have the same weight. A sha1 and a sha256 operation are not the same thing. My personal opinion (without writing the code, mind you) about the proposed 1000 hashing-units limit is that it makes little sense to single-out hashing functions.
It is pretty easy to calculate a weight for every operator while running, and give a max weight there. Instantly solving your for loop conundrum and indeed the quadratic issue in one go with a clean and predictable design.
The 1000 hashing limit, for instance, and the 130kb too is you setting the limits by usage. What you expect a contract to need. This places the limit squarely in the first side, you have the expertise in the NEEDs of the VM.
I respectfully disagree. The limits are there to protect the full node implementations. Your point of you thinking users wonāt need more is valid and taken. But I read it very much like the people never needing more than 640kb. (for the young ones, thatās a reference, not literal)
I think the way to actually decide on actual limits should be based on actually running code in a native implementation (native means compiled to assembly).
If it turns out that it is essentially free to increase the memory usage of the stack from 130KB to 25MB, we can have a discussion why it would be somehow a problem to do so as you advice against it (why did you?). I donāt expect the machines that run the chain to get lower specs over the next decade, afterall.
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Heās saying āfor 2025ā, and Iād say at this level of research thatās the conservative approach: the need is satisfied, and we can be sure the change wonāt bottle-neck anything since the proposed adjustments are well below the theoretically possible limits.
Later, when more research & development in node software is done, we could further increase them, why not?
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Assuming a 1GB block in the future is only filled with such maximum-sized VM smart contracts, how much memory and CPU time would it roughly theoretically take to validate such block?
While itās cool to give more power to developers, we should be careful not to damage anything either now or in the future.
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Depends on the number of parallel validation threads the machine has. it does NOT depend on the number of transactions (or the blocksize) itself.
If its a Pi, then it takes 100MB in my example 25MB stack limit. It would make the bch full node allocate that once in the entire operation of the full node.
You wouldnāt even notice, in other words. (Pi5 comes with 4 or 8GB)
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The problem is over-complicating stuff, an open standard that has too many little limits and features. I call it an open standard a little bit optimistically, but if we want more implementations in the decades to come we have to see it as such.
For instance the quadratic hashing issue caused a consensus change in BitcoinCash various years ago based on very similar discusions that did not include actual real hardware testing. Just models and speculation. Even though various years before that the actual issue was already shown to be a non-issue. I want to make sure we donāt make the same type of mistake again.
The idea I showed above about a cost to each opcode that is being run would replace a lot of different concepts:
Big chunks of:
And indeed the proposed 1000 hash-units from this chip draft.
So, to reiterate my point, requirements are great input to this discussion. I fully trust Jason to be capable and motivated to find the lower limits he feels we should be able to process in a BitcoinCash full node.
Now lets check what the actual, tested-in-running-software bottlenecks are before we introduce new consensus level limits, no?
Edit; sigop-limits were introduced by Core a very long time ago, similarly without actually doing the research which is why we replaced them in bch the first moment we got as they were useless to actually protect the thing they were supposed to protect.
Not a new thing, the problem Iām trying to fight here. 
Great CHIP!
Got me wondering if there could be any historical UTXOs secured by hashes that would become vulnerable to a length-extension or identical-prefix collision attack as a result of the element size increase.
The answer is no, thatās not how hashes get used in Bitcoin, but I was interested to discover Peter Toddās SHA1 collision bounty where the winner extracted a 520byte collision from a 422kB collision (two PDFs) to satisfy the element size limit.
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