Thanks for the reply. Iām mostly viewing this issue from a practical standpoint -
āHow do we get a realistic to execute, structured process so participants have maximum information, so that outcomes become clear almost all the time, to stave off muddy, prolonged, chaotic and destructive conflicts of the past?ā
The document I posted is intended to outline how to do that, it is not just a ātemplateā, hence the loads of background, observations and assumptions.
If someone else have a better way to do that, I welcome them, but I do expect any such efforts to be as structured as mine or even more so. There is not much room for us to leave things ambiguous and open-ended; conflicts with rise without a concrete process, and BCH will fall into one of the much worse alternatives:
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The protocol ossifies as conflicts get longer and muddier (see also: BTC).
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Without a clear process to do things and clear milestones to force outcomes for a given cycle, a dictator rises, even a reluctant dictator, by necessity. We have already seen that happen once. The more structure and information you put into a process, ironically the less power any one person or team has, as they too will be bounded by clearly observable rules and information.
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The chain falls into utter chaos and splits.
I think we can all agree that none of the above are desirable, hence the need for a more structured process.
Some other things:
The dispute resolution part is meant to be costly, difficult and only invoked rarely; if someone invokes the process, miners are already āoverwhelmingly pressuredā into doing something. If they donāt particularly feel the need to step up and participate, perhaps the issue is not important enough, and the CHIP proponent (or detractor) should simply back down.
Having support from at least one custodial exchange is also necessary for the success of a dispute; without which the process will simply fail, it does not matter how we want it to be. The miner and stake signals have similar purposes; without them the challenge has no chance of success anyway.
Once a dispute is formally raised the chain is effectively in what would lead to a crisis in the past, except this time the crisis can be resolved in a high-information and structured way, with a clear outcome, so that thereās less chance of a split in the end. Hence ongoing cost isnāt as much an issue, because the alternative is much worse.
If you have a better way to do dispute resolution, please recommend one! But I do expect any such process to have an outcome as unambiguous as mine, if not more, with participants having similar real powers as the miner/stake/exchange trio.
It is nice to think the schedule should/can be a CHIP that itself seeks a wide consensus, but experience in the past few months led me to the conclusion that itās likely impossible given the extremely wide spectrum of opinions, and incredibly rigid positions of the opinions. At some point someone has to just put things on the table that at least has a chance to gain begrudging acceptance from most people, and then it will simply be āacceptedā or rejected de facto, depending on CHIPs that follow it.
Thatās by no means a pretty way to do it, but consider the alternative. The alternative is the abyss (see also the three likely outcomes above), and the abyss will come really soon. I think I very much prefer having a practical process on the table and getting flakked for it, than leaving things open-ended and seeing things rapidly devolve into chaos or dictatorship as November approaches.
